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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether Ridgewood Board of 
Education provided its student M.E. with a "free 
appropriate public education" as required by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. 
S 1400 et seq. (Supp. 1998). The District Court found the 
board of education satisfied IDEA because it provided M.E. 
"more than a trivial educational benefit." Because we hold 
that IDEA imposes a higher standard, we will vacate and 
remand. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Clifford Scott Green, United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
M.E.1 is a seventeen-year old high-school student whose 
learning disabilities qualify him as a "child[ ] with 
disabilities" under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.A. S 1400 et seq. (Supp. 
1998). M.E. has attended schools in Ridgewood Board of 
Education's school district since the fall of 1988, when he 
started second grade at the Orchard School. At the 
beginning of the second grade, his teacher noticed that his 
academic skills were far below those of his classmates and 
the school moved him to the first grade. At that time, the 
school told M.E.'s parents that he did not have a learning 
disability and was in fact very intelligent. 
 
M.E.'s difficulties continued in the first grade. On the 
recommendation of his teacher, his parents enrolled him in 
summer school. Despite this extra instruction, M.E.'s 
second grade teacher commented that his skills remained 
very weak. Standardized tests conducted during the second 
grade confirmed his teacher's assessment: M.E.'s scores 
ranged between the fourth and ninth percentiles. M.E. 
again attended summer classes on the school's 
recommendation. 
 
Hoping that a new school might help their son, M.E.'s 
parents asked Ridgewood to transfer M.E. to Ridge School, 
another elementary school in the Ridgewood district, for the 
third grade. But M.E.'s difficulties continued at Ridge. As a 
result, Ridgewood and M.E.'s parents agreed that M.E. 
should receive Basic Skills Instruction twice a week and 
work with his teacher after school twice a week. M.E.'s 
parents also had M.E. examined by independent learning 
disabilities teacher consultant Howard Glaser. Glaser's 
October 1990 evaluation found that there was a great 
discrepancy between M.E.'s intellectual abilities and his 
academic performance: although M.E.'s intelligence was at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. M.E.'s claims were brought by M.E.'s father as guardian ad litem and 
his mother as guardian ad litem and individually. To minimize 
confusion, we also refer to the family as "M.E." 
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the ninety-fifth percentile, his reading skills were at the 
second percentile. Glaser also found that M.E. was learning 
disabled and recommended that M.E.'s parents ask 
Ridgewood to evaluate M.E. 
 
Ridgewood's Child Study Team (CST) evaluated M.E. in 
March, 1991. The Ridgewood CST agreed with Glaser's 
assessment that there was a great discrepancy between 
M.E.'s abilities and his performance in school. It also noted 
that the discrepancy was growing and that M.E. was 
becoming very anxious about his academic performance. 
But it refused to classify him as learning disabled because 
it concluded that he was not "perceptually impaired" within 
the meaning of New Jersey law.2 The Ridgewood CST 
recommended that Ridgewood provide M.E. with "increased 
multi-sensory support" and that his parents obtain 
counseling for him. 
 
M.E.'s academic difficulties continued throughout the 
remainder of elementary school. In fifth grade, M.E.'s 
teacher and his parents asked Ridgewood to evaluate him 
again. Ridgewood refused to do so. In sixth grade, 
Ridgewood agreed to re-evaluate M.E. only after a learning 
disabilities teacher consultant hired by M.E.'s parents 
recommended it do so. The Ridgewood CST's May-June 
1994 evaluations consisted of an educational assessment, a 
psychological assessment, a health appraisal and a 
psychiatric evaluation. The CST concluded that M.E. 
remained far behind his classmates and recommended that 
he and his parents seek counseling to explore his feelings 
of inadequacy and depression. But the CST maintained that 
M.E showed no signs of perceptual deficits, again refused to 
classify him as perceptually impaired and determined that 
he was not eligible for special education. 
 
M.E.'s in-class troubles worsened during the seventh 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 28, S 6:28 (1991) defines "perceptually impaired" 
as "a specific learning disability manifested in a disorder in 
understanding and learning, which affects the ability to listen, think, 
speak, read, write, spell and/or compute to the extent that special 
education is necessary for achievement in an educational program." New 
Jersey uses the phrase "perceptually impaired" instead of IDEA's phrase 
"specific learning disabilities." 
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grade, where he consistently failed English and received 
incompletes in other classes. Concerned that Ridgewood's 
CST had erred in failing to classify M.E. as perceptually 
impaired, M.E.'s parents asked Ridgewood to provide an 
evaluation by an independent child study team. After the 
parents filed for an administrative hearing, Ridgewood 
agreed to the request and contracted with Bergen 
Independent Child Study Teams for the evaluation. 
Ridgewood Director of Special Programs John Campion 
ordered Bergen not to recommend whether M.E. should be 
classified as perceptually impaired or how he should be 
educated. M.E.'s parents strongly disagreed with these 
limitations and asked the Parent Information Center of New 
Jersey to intervene. After the Parent Information Center 
determined that Bergen could make classification and 
placement recommendations, Bergen agreed to make these 
recommendations in the final team report it would provide 
to Ridgewood but not in the preliminary evaluation reports 
individual team members would prepare. 
 
Bergen's team staffing report diagnosed M.E. with a 
learning disability in reading and writing and recommended 
that Ridgewood classify him as perceptually impaired. 
M.E.'s parents allege that Ridgewood intentionally withheld 
this report from them despite their repeated requests and 
that Ridgewood gave them the team staffing report only 
after the New Jersey Department of Education ordered it to 
do so. 
 
On March 17, 1995, Ridgewood agreed to classify M.E. as 
perceptually impaired. It recommended that he continue in 
the Basic Skills Instruction he had been receiving for six 
years and developed an individualized education program 
(IEP) for the 1995-96 school year. The IEP called for thirty 
minutes of individual Orton Gillingham3  instruction in 
reading and spelling, resource center instruction in English 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Orton-Gillingham technique is a "linguistic-phonetic approach 
[towards reading] with an emphasis on teaching the student to learn how 
to decode words." Wall v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Sch. Dist., 945 F. Supp. 
501, 505 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). It is designed to "enhance a dyslexic 
individual's capacity to read, write, and spell." Pascoe v. 
Washingtonville 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 1998 WL 684583, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 1998). 
 
                                5 
  
and supplementary instruction in science and social 
studies. M.E.'s parents maintain they objected to the IEP 
and allege that Ridgewood coerced them to agree to it by 
threatening to break off all discussions concerning M.E.'s 
educational program unless they approved the IEP. The IEP 
proved ineffective. M.E. made minimal improvements and 
Ridgewood changed his grades to pass-fail in order to 
minimize the impact on his self-esteem. 
 
At the end of the eighth grade, Ridgewood decided that 
M.E. should no longer be placed in regular classes. For the 
1996-97 school year, it proposed an IEP that provided for 
resource center instruction in all academic classes, two 
daily periods of supplementary instruction with a teacher 
trained in the Wilson reading program and 
speech/language therapy once a week. It also scheduled 
regular classroom instruction for physical education and 
electives. M.E.'s parents disagreed with the IEP, claiming it 
provided fewer services than his inadequate 1995-96 IEP 
and arguing it would stigmatize M.E., damaging his 
already-fragile self-esteem. On May 27, 1996, M.E.'s 
parents requested a due process hearing before the New 
Jersey Department of Education, contending that 
Ridgewood's proposed IEP for 1996-97 failed to provide a 
"free appropriate public education" within the meaning of 
IDEA and requesting that M.E. be placed in private school 
at Ridgewood's expense. Concerned that Ridgewood would 
not provide their son an adequate education, M.E.'s parents 
began to visit other schools and eventually asked 
Ridgewood to place M.E. at the Landmark School, a private 
school in Massachusetts that specializes in educating 
students with learning disabilities. After Ridgewood refused 
their request, M.E.'s parents then asked that Ridgewood 
pay for him to attend Landmark's summer program. After 
Ridgewood refused, M.E. attended Landmark's summer 
program at his parents' expense and, according to his 
instructors there, made steady and considerable progress. 
 
B. 
 
While M.E. was at Landmark, an Administrative Law 
Judge conducted seven days of hearings on his parents' 
complaint. In the fall of 1996, M.E. returned to Ridgewood 
 
                                6 
  
to begin ninth grade. On November 27, 1996, the ALJ held 
that Ridgewood's 1996-97 IEP failed to provide M.E. with a 
free appropriate public education. In arriving at this 
conclusion, she considered the testimony of M.E.'s parents, 
Howard Glaser, Dr. Mae Balaban of Bergen, M.E.'s 
classroom teachers and the Ridgewood CST. She also 
considered a letter written by Dr. Balaban on November 4, 
1996, over a month after the last hearing. In that letter, Dr. 
Balaban criticized the 1996-97 IEP, stating that she was 
"convinced that [it] will not result in . .. an adequate 
education." She strongly recommended that M.E. be placed 
at Landmark, where he would "be given the chance to 
develop at least average reading and writing skills so as to 
become a functional adult." 
 
The ALJ then ordered Ridgewood to pay M.E.'s tuition at 
Landmark, holding such a placement is warranted when"it 
is shown that it is not appropriate to provide educational 
services for the pupil in a public setting." Concluding that 
M.E.'s Landmark placement would remain appropriate until 
Ridgewood "offers an appropriate program and placement", 
the ALJ nonetheless refused to order Ridgewood to pay for 
the non-tuition costs of the Landmark placement. The ALJ 
also denied M.E.'s request for compensatory education, 
finding that Ridgewood's failure to classify M.E. as disabled 
did not rise to the required level of bad faith or willful 
misconduct. Finally, the ALJ concluded that M.E. was 
entitled to reimbursement for the tuition costs of attending 
Landmark's summer program in 1996. 
 
C. 
 
On January 20, 1997, pursuant to the ALJ's decision, 
M.E. enrolled in Landmark at Ridgewood's expense. In April 
1997, Ridgewood filed a complaint in federal court under 
20 U.S.C.A. S 1415(i)(2) (1998), an action that had the effect 
of appealing the ALJ's decision. M.E. brought a 
counterclaim seeking compensatory education and the non- 
tuition costs of attending Landmark. He also filed a third- 
party complaint against various Ridgewood administrators 
and child study team members, alleging violations of IDEA, 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq., 42 
U.S.C. S 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. S 1983, New Jersey state law 
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and the United States Constitution and seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. 
 
On July 30, 1998, the District Court reversed the ALJ's 
decision that Ridgewood had not provided M.E. a free 
appropriate education. The District Court also held that the 
ALJ should not have considered Dr. Balaban's November 4, 
1996 letter because Ridgewood never consented to its 
admission and because Ridgewood had not been given a 
"full and fair opportunity" to cross-examine Dr. Balaban on 
the portions of the letter that contradicted her live 
testimony before the ALJ. 
 
In finding that Ridgewood had provided M.E. a free 
appropriate public education, the District Court stated that 
IDEA requires only that an IEP provide a disabled student 
with "more than a trivial educational benefit" and, relying 
on the testimony of Ridgewood's witnesses and Dr. 
Balaban, concluded that Ridgewood's IEP had done so. The 
District Court found that Dr. Balaban never characterized 
M.E.'s IEP as "inappropriate" but testified that the IEP 
would provide M.E. with an educational benefit. 
 
Because it reversed the ALJ's determination that 
Ridgewood had not provided M.E. a free appropriate public 
education, the District Court also reversed the ALJ's 
decision that Ridgewood pay M.E.'s tuition at Landmark, 
stating that even if M.E.'s IEP were inappropriate, no 
evidence suggested that he could not be educated in a 
public setting. 
 
The District Court affirmed the ALJ's decision to deny 
M.E. compensatory education and reimbursement for 
tutoring expenses. It rejected the ALJ's conclusion that 
compensatory education requires bad faith, stating our 
opinion in Carlisle Area School District v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 
520 (3d Cir. 1995) established the right to compensatory 
education once the school district knows or should have 
known its IEP has failed. But the District Court held M.E. 
had no right to compensatory education because M.E.'s IEP 
had not been a failure. At the same time, the District Court 
dismissed M.E.'s request for expenses and costs in the 
administrative proceedings because M.E. was no longer the 
prevailing party. 
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The District Court also granted Ridgewood summary 
judgment on M.E.'s third-party complaint seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. M.E.'s S 1983 claims asserted violations of S 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. S 1985 and IDEA. 
The District Court dismissed M.E.'s S 504 claims because 
he had not demonstrated he was " `excluded from 
participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to 
discrimination at, the school' " and dismissed his S 1985 
claim because he had not shown that the alleged violation 
of his rights was motivated by "racial or `otherwise class- 
based' animus." It dismissed M.E.'s IDEA claims because it 
determined Ridgewood had fully complied with IDEA. In 
addition, the District Court held all of M.E.'s third-party 
claims failed "to overcome the qualified immunity enjoyed 
by municipal employees sued in their individual capacity." 
 
M.E. appealed to this court on August 26, 1998. Before 
we heard argument, the District Court on September 1, 
1998 enjoined implementation of its July 30 order, an act 
that kept M.E. enrolled in Landmark at Ridgewood's 
expense. On September 9, a motions panel of this court 
stayed the District Court's September 1 order, which 
effectively reinstated the District Court's July 30 order. But 
M.E. remained at Landmark pursuant to an agreement 
between his parents and the school. At oral argument on 
November 4, 1998, M.E. asked this panel to require 
Ridgewood to pay his Landmark expenses. After oral 
argument, we ordered Ridgewood to comply with the 
District Court's September 1 order and pay M.E.'s tuition, 
residential and transportation costs at Landmark. M.E. 
remains at Landmark at the present time. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
The initial question is whether the District Court erred in 
deciding that Ridgewood's 1996-97 IEP provided M.E. with 
a free appropriate education.4 We review the grant of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In his brief, M.E. contends the District Court applied an improper 
standard of review to the ALJ's decision that his 1996-97 IEP was 
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summary judgment under a plenary standard. See In re 
Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 229 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.A. S 1400 et seq., to assist 
states in educating disabled children. In order to receive 
funding under IDEA, a state must provide all disabled 
students with a "free appropriate public education." 20 
U.S.C.A. S 1412(1) (Supp. 1998).5  This education must be 
tailored to the unique needs of the disabled student 
through an individualized educational program ("IEP"). See 
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1982). 
 
IDEA leaves to the courts the task of interpreting "free 
appropriate public education." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 
188-89. The Supreme Court began this task in Board of 
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), holding that 
while an IEP need not maximize the potential of a disabled 
student, it must provide "meaningful" access to education, 
id. at 192, and confer "some educational benefit" upon the 
child for whom it is designed. Id. at 200. In determining the 
quantum of educational benefit necessary to satisfy IDEA, 
the Court explicitly rejected a bright-line rule. Noting that 
children of different abilities are capable of greatly different 
achievements, the Court instead adopted an approach that 
requires a court to consider the potential of the particular 
disabled student before it. See id. at 202; see also Hall v. 
Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that Rowley holds that "no single substantive 
standard can describe how much educational benefit is 
sufficient to satisfy [IDEA]"). 
 
We first interpreted the phrase "free appropriate public 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
inappropriate. Because we will vacate the District Court's judgment that 
the IEP was appropriate, we need not determine whether the District 
Court applied the proper standard of review to the ALJ's decision. 
 
5. IDEA defines "children with disabilities" as children who need special 
education because of "mental retardation, hearing impairments including 
deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including 
blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, 
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific 
learning disabilities." 20 U.S.C.A. S 1401(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1998). 
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education" in Board of Education v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 
(3d Cir. 1986), when we rejected the notion that the 
provision of any educational benefit satisfies IDEA, holding 
that IDEA "clearly imposes a higher standard." Id. at 991. 
Examining the quantum of benefit necessary for an IEP to 
satisfy IDEA, we held in Polk v. Central Susquehanna 
Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988), that 
IDEA "calls for more than a trivial educational benefit" and 
requires a satisfactory IEP to provide "significant learning," 
id. at 182, and confer "meaningful benefit." Id. at 184. We 
also rejected the notion that what was "appropriate" could 
be reduced to a single standard, id., holding the benefit 
"must be gauged in relation to the child's potential." Id. at 
185. When students display considerable intellectual 
potential, IDEA requires "a great deal more than a 
negligible [benefit]." Id. at 182. 
 
As noted, the District Court held that an IEP need only 
provide "more than a trivial educational benefit" in order to 
be appropriate, equating this minimal amount of benefit 
with a "meaningful educational benefit." But the standard 
set forth in Polk requires "significant learning" and 
"meaningful benefit." The provision of merely "more than a 
trivial educational benefit" does not meet these standards. 
 
It appears also that the District Court may not have given 
adequate consideration to M.E.'s intellectual potential in 
arriving in its conclusion that Ridgewood's IEP was 
appropriate. Although its opinion discussed the IEP in 
considerable detail, it did not analyze the type and amount 
of learning of which M.E. is capable. As we have discussed, 
Rowley and Polk reject a bright-line rule on the amount of 
benefit required of an appropriate IEP in favor of an 
approach requiring a student-by-student analysis that 
carefully considers the student's individual abilities. 
 
Therefore we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court on this issue and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We see no error in the District Court's decision to strike Dr. 
Balaban's 
November 4, 1996 letter for the reasons stated by the District Court. 
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B. 
 
Because we have vacated the District Court's judgment 
that Ridgewood provided M.E. with a free appropriate 
public education, we must review all the judgments that 
flow from it, specifically, that M.E. was not entitled to 
placement at Landmark, that he was not entitled to 
compensatory education, that he was not entitled to 
expenses and costs as the prevailing party at the 
administrative hearing and that he could assert no third- 
party claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
1. Placement at Landmark 
 
The District Court held that Ridgewood was not required 
to pay M.E.'s tuition at Landmark for the 1996-1997 school 
year because his IEP had provided him a free appropriate 
public education. But even if M.E.'s IEP were inappropriate, 
the District Court said there was no "evidence in the record 
suggesting that it is not appropriate to provide educational 
services for [M.E.] in a public setting." M.E. contends the 
District Court's approach requires a student seeking private 
placement to show not only that private placement is 
appropriate but also that all public placements are 
inappropriate. This approach, he argues, places an 
impossible burden on the student. We are not convinced 
that M.E. correctly interpreted the District Court's holding. 
Nonetheless, we do not believe that IDEA requires the 
student to prove that all public placements are 
inappropriate. 
 
To determine when a disabled student is entitled to a 
private placement, we look to Florence County School 
District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), in which the 
Supreme Court held that a student may be entitled to 
reimbursement if "a federal court concludes both that the 
public placement violated IDEA and that the private school 
placement was proper under [IDEA]." Id. at 15. Under 
Florence County, a court may award a disabled student the 
cost of his private placement if (1) the court determines the 
student's IEP is inappropriate and (2) the student 
demonstrates that the private placement he seeks is proper. 
See Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 
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129 (2d Cir. 1998).7 A private placement may be proper if 
it is appropriate and provided in the least restrictive 
educational environment. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 
F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1993). To meet the Florence 
County standard, a disabled student is not required to 
demonstrate that he cannot be educated in a public setting. 
Under IDEA, the relevant question is not whether a student 
could in theory receive an appropriate education in a public 
setting but whether he will receive such an education. We 
note the ALJ concluded that Landmark would remain 
appropriate until Ridgewood offered an appropriate IEP. 
 
Ridgewood contends that the "least restrictive educational 
environment" requirement bars M.E. from attending 
Landmark because Landmark's residential program is more 
restrictive than Ridgewood's. Under this approach, M.E. 
could receive an inappropriate education in Ridgewood's 
schools but be denied a private placement because it is 
more restrictive than placement in a Ridgewood public 
school. But IDEA requires that disabled students be 
educated in the least restrictive appropriate educational 
environment.8 See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 
1213 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that IDEA requires an 
education to be appropriate and provided in the least 
restrictive educational environment); Kruelle v. New Castle 
Cty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating 
that inappropriate educational environments are not 
relevant for "least restrictive environment" analysis); see 
also Cleveland Heights-University Heights City Sch. Dist. v. 
Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 400 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
private school's failure to satisfy least restrictive 
environment requirement does not bar parents' claim for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that the District Court has the discretion to determine the 
appropriate amount of reimbursement. See Florence County, 510 U.S. at 
16 (stating that reimbursement is equitable relief to be awarded after 
consideration of all relevant factors). For example, the student cannot 
receive total reimbursement if the fees of the private school are 
unreasonable. 
 
8. We also note that the appropriateness of a private placement is 
evaluated by the same standard set forth in part III.A. of this opinion. 
In 
other words, parents of a disabled student need not seek out the perfect 
private placement in order to satisfy IDEA. 
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reimbursement); Board of Educ. of Murphysboro v. Illinois 
Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating 
that the least restrictive environment requirement"was not 
developed to promote integration with non-disabled peers at 
the expense of other IDEA educational requirements" and 
does not apply unless education is appropriate). 
 
We are unable to determine if the District Court applied 
this standard in concluding M.E. was not entitled to 
placement at Landmark and therefore will remand this 
issue to the District Court for reconsideration. 
 
2. Compensatory Education 
 
Under IDEA, a disabled student is entitled to a free 
appropriate public education until the student reaches age 
twenty-one. See 20 U.S.C.A. S 1412(2)(B). An award of 
compensatory education allows a disabled student to 
continue beyond age twenty-one in order to make up for the 
earlier deprivation of a free appropriate public education. 
See M.C. v. Central Reg. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d 
Cir. 1996). In Carlisle Area School District v. Scott P., 62 
F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995), we declined to state a precise 
standard for the award of compensatory education, but 
noted that most of our cases awarding compensatory 
education involve egregious circumstances or the flagrant 
failure to comply with IDEA. Id. at 536-37. One year later, 
in M.C. v. Central Regional School District, we "flesh[ed] out 
the standard left sparse by Carlisle" and held that the right 
to compensatory education accrues when the school knows 
or should know that its IEP is not providing an appropriate 
education. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 396. We specifically 
rejected a bad faith or egregious circumstances standard, 
stating that "a child's entitlement to special education 
should not . . . be abridged because the [school] district's 
behavior did not rise to the level of slothfulness or bad 
faith." Id. at 397. 
 
Applied narrowly, M.C.'s "inappropriate IEP" requirement 
might prohibit the award of compensatory education for 
years in which a disabled student received an inappropriate 
education via means other than an IEP.9  But we do not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In M.C., we stated that "the right to compensatory education should 
accrue from the point that the school district knows or should know of 
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think the M.C. court intended such an application because 
it held the denial of an appropriate education--and not 
merely the denial of an appropriate IEP--creates the right 
to compensatory education. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 391-92 ("A 
school district that knows or should know that a child has 
an inappropriate [IEP] or is not receiving more than a de 
minimis benefit must, of course, correct the situation. We 
hold that . . . a disabled child is entitled to compensatory 
education for a period equal to the deprivation."); id. at 395 
(citation omitted) ("Under IDEA, a disabled student is 
entitled to free, appropriate education until he or she 
reaches age twenty-one. A court award of compensatory 
education requires a school district to . . . make up for any 
earlier deprivation."). IDEA's central goal is that disabled 
students receive an appropriate education, not merely an 
appropriate IEP. Therefore, a disabled student's right to 
compensatory education accrues when the school knows or 
should know that the student is receiving an inappropriate 
education. 
 
The District Court rejected M.E.'s request for 
compensatory education and reimbursement for tutoring 
because it believed those remedies were available only when 
an IEP was inappropriate. As noted, it concluded that 
M.E.'s 1996-97 IEP was appropriate. M.E. maintains that 
he never received a free appropriate public education from 
Ridgewood and that he presented substantial evidence that 
Ridgewood knew or should have known he was disabled 
shortly after he enrolled at the Orchard School in 1988. He 
contends that the District Court erred as a matter of law 
when it dismissed his claim for compensatory education 
from 1988 to 1997 after a finding that M.E. had received a 
free appropriate education during the 1996-97 school year. 
He also contends his parents are entitled to reimbursement 
for $6,400 in tutoring expenses incurred from 1989 to 
1992. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the IEP's failure," M.C., 81 F.3d at 396, and that an "award of 
compensatory education require[s] a finding that an IEP was 
inappropriate." Id. at n.6. The M.C.  court did not have to consider 
whether compensatory education was awardable for years in which a 
disabled student had no IEP because the plaintiff did not ask for 
compensatory education for such years. 
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Ridgewood responds that M.E. cannot recover 
compensatory education because he received a free 
appropriate public education. It also contends there is no 
evidence of culpable conduct or egregious circumstances, 
asserting it provided M.E. with extensive assistance. 
Further, Ridgewood argues M.E.'s parents' failure to object 
to his programs and placements from 1988 to 1996 created 
"presumptively a free and appropriate education" during 
those years and bars claims for compensatory education. 
Finally, Ridgewood asserts that all compensatory education 
claims involving events that occurred more than two years 
ago are barred by a two-year statute of limitations adopted 
by this court in Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon School District, 
95 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Whether Ridgewood's 1996-97 IEP provided M.E. with an 
appropriate education will be decided by the District Court 
on remand. As we stated in M.C., an award of 
compensatory education does not require a finding of bad 
faith or egregious circumstances. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 397. 
Furthermore, failure to object to M.E.'s placement does not 
deprive him of the right to an appropriate education. In 
M.C., we held that "a child's entitlement to special 
education should not depend upon the vigilance of the 
parents." See M.C., 81 F.3d at 396. Finally, Ridgewood's 
statute of limitations argument lacks merit and its reliance 
on Jeremy H. is misplaced. In Jeremy H. we expressly 
declined to choose a statute of limitations for IDEA actions, 
see Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 280 n.15 ("We . . . need not, and 
do not, decide between a two-year and a six-year limitations 
period."), but decided the limitations period begins to run 
"once the state administrative process has run its course." 
Id. at 280. Also, Jeremy H. considered the appropriate 
statute of limitations for IDEA claims brought in 
Pennsylvania, not New Jersey. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 
U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (stating that if a federal statute 
does not specify a statute of limitations, courts apply the 
relevant statute of limitations of the forum state); Beauty 
Time, Inc. v. Vu Skin Sys. Inc., 118 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 
1997) (same); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 
443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981) (same). 
 
In assessing the statute of limitations governing a 
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compensatory education claim brought in New Jersey, we 
must determine the most analogous cause of action under 
New Jersey law. An analogous cause of action is a "claim[ ] 
against [a] public entity" alleging "injury or damage to 
person," N.J. Stat. Ann. S 59:8-8, under the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act, in which the statute of limitations is two 
years.10 We have previously held that IDEA claims closely 
resemble actions to recover damages for injuries caused by 
another. See Tokarcik, 665 F.2d at 454. Another analogous 
cause of action might be a basic personal injury claim, 
which also carries a two-year statute of limitations. See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:14-2. 
 
Because M.E. brought his claim for compensatory 
education within either statute of limitations, we need not 
decide whether his claim is more analogous to a Tort 
Claims Act claim or a basic personal injury claim. Under 
either cause of action, the statute begins to run once 
plaintiff 's cause of action accrues. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 59:8-8; N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:14-2. As noted, Jeremy H. 
held that a federal IDEA claim accrues at the conclusion of 
the state administrative process. See Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 
280. The limitations period for M.E.'s claim began to run on 
November 27, 1996, when the ALJ issued her ruling, and 
M.E. filed his complaint on July 3, 1997. 
 
Therefore we conclude the District Court erred when it 
dismissed M.E.'s claim for compensatory education for the 
years 1988-1996 on a finding that his 1996-1997 IEP was 
appropriate. The appropriateness of M.E.'s 1996-1997 
education is irrelevant to the appropriateness of his 
education from 1988 to 1996.11 In addition, our decision to 
vacate the judgment that M.E.'s 1996-1997 IEP was 
appropriate compels us to vacate the grant of summary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Such a claim must be brought against a "public entity", which 
includes "any county, municipality, district, public authority, public 
agency and any other . . . public body in the State." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 59:1-3. Ridgewood meets this definition. 
 
11. Because the dismissal of M.E.'s claim for 1989-1992 tutoring 
expenses was also based on the conclusion that the 1996-97 IEP was 
appropriate, we will vacate the dismissal of tutoring expenses claim and 
remand it to the District Court. 
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judgment on M.E.'s claim for compensatory education for 
the 1996-1997 school year. On remand, the District Court 
should determine whether M.E. received an appropriate 
education in each school year and, if it concludes he did 
not, determine when Ridgewood knew or should have 
known of that fact. 
 
3. Costs and Fees at the Administrative Hearing 
 
A plaintiff may obtain fees and costs when he "prevails," 
or obtains merits-based relief that " `materially alters the 
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the 
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the 
plaintiff.' " D.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 
896, 902 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 
103, 112 (1992)). The District Court denied M.E.'s request 
for costs and fees because its reversal of the ALJ's decision 
meant that M.E. was no longer a prevailing party. Our 
decision to vacate the District Court's reversal requires that 
we vacate and remand the denial of fees and costs. 
 
4. Third-Party Claims Under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 does not confer substantive rights but 
"merely redresses the deprivation of . . . rights. . . created 
by the Constitution or federal statute." W.B. v. Matula, 67 
F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995). In other words, a S 1983 suit 
must allege the violation of a federal right provided 
elsewhere. The District Court granted Ridgewood summary 
judgment on all of M.E.'s third-party claims because it 
concluded the third-party complaint asserted individual 
capacity claims against which the third-party defendants 
enjoyed qualified immunity. It also held that many of the 
claims were subject to dismissal on other grounds. 
 
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we apply 
the same standards as does a District Court. We will affirm 
the grant of summary judgment only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Newport Assocs. Dev. Co. 
v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 162 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Once the moving party points to evidence demonstrating no 
issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party has the 
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duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder 
could rule in its favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Groman v. 
Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Speculation and conclusory allegations do not satisfy this 
duty. Groman, 47 F.3d at 637. 
 
a. Nature of Third-Party Complaint 
 
In order to prevail on a S 1983 suit brought against 
defendants in their official capacity, the plaintiff must 
establish that the deprivation of his rights was the result of 
an official policy or custom. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997); Monell v. New York City 
Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 
The District Court held that M.E. provided no evidence 
that third-party defendants acted pursuant to a municipal 
policy. M.E. contends his third-party complaint was"clearly 
brought against third-party defendants in both their 
individual and official capacities" and that the third-party 
defendants acted pursuant to "some policy or custom" of 
Ridgewood. We disagree. M.E. has provided no evidence 
that Ridgewood's policy is to ignore the responsibilities 
imposed by IDEA. Rather the evidence presented was that 
Ridgewood failed to fulfill its responsibilities. Therefore we 
will affirm the order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment on this issue. 
 
b. IDEA Claims 
 
Initially we note that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit recently held that a plaintiff may not sue under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 for IDEA violations because"IDEA provides a 
comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of its own 
requirements." Sellers v. School Board, 141 F.3d 524, 529 
(4th Cir. 1998). But we must follow our decision in W.B. v. 
Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), which held that IDEA 
claims may be actionable under S 1983. The District Court 
entered summary judgment on M.E.'s S 1983 claims 
alleging IDEA violations because it held Ridgewood had 
"fully complied" with IDEA. M.E. contends the District 
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Court erred when it entered summary judgment on his 
IDEA claims alleging violations from 1988 to September 
1996 on a finding that his 1996-97 IEP was appropriate. He 
claims that from 1988 to 1996 Ridgewood failed in its 
obligation to timely evaluate him, to inform his parents of 
their rights and to provide him with special education. 
 
Because the District Court discussed only the 1996-97 
school year, it would appear that the grant of summary 
judgment on M.E.'s IDEA claims was based solely on a 
finding that the 1996-97 IEP was appropriate. Because a 
satisfactory 1996-97 IEP has no bearing on whether 
Ridgewood complied with IDEA before the 1996 school year, 
we will vacate the grant of summary judgment on M.E.'s 
IDEA claims. 
 
c. Section 504 Claims 
 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq. 
(Supp. 1998), prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
disability in federally funded programs. In order to 
establish a violation of S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a 
plaintiff must prove that (1) he is "disabled" as defined by 
the Act; (2) he is "otherwise qualified" to participate in 
school activities; (3) the school or the board of education 
receives federal financial assistance; and (4) he was 
excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or 
subject to discrimination at, the school. W.B. v. Matula, 67 
F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Nathanson v. Medical 
Coll. of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants 
know or should be reasonably expected to know of his 
disability. See id. But a plaintiff need not prove that 
defendants' discrimination was intentional. See id. We have 
held that there are few differences, if any, between IDEA's 
affirmative duty and S 504's negative prohibition and have 
noted that the regulations implementing S 504 require that 
school districts "provide a free appropriate education to 
each qualified handicapped person in [its] jurisdiction." Id. 
at 492-93. 
 
The District Court granted Ridgewood summary 
judgment on M.E.'s S 504 claim[s] because it found "no 
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evidence . . . that M.E. `was excluded from participation in, 
denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination' " at 
Ridgewood schools. M.E. argues that Ridgewood violated 
S 504 when it failed to identify him as learning disabled, 
when it failed to inform his parents of Ridgewood's IDEA 
responsibilities and when it failed to provide him a free 
appropriate public education. 
 
We believe M.E. has presented evidence demonstrating 
that a genuine issue of fact exists. In W.B. v. Matula, we 
held that a school's failure to notify parents of its IDEA 
duties could violate S 504, see Matula, 67 F.3d at 501 n.13, 
and also held that S 504 imposes a "childfind" duty, or the 
duty to identify a disabled child "within a reasonable time 
after school officials are on notice of behavior that is likely 
to indicate a disability." Id. at 500-01. In addition, the 
failure to provide a free appropriate public education 
violates IDEA and therefore could violate S 504. See id. at 
492-93 (stating that IDEA and S 504 impose nearly 
identical duties and noting that S 504's implementing 
regulations require that schools provide a "free appropriate 
public education"). Therefore we will vacate the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on M.E.'s S 504 claims 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.12 
 
d. Section 1985 Conspiracy Claim 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies predicated on 
"racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 
discriminatory animus." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 
88, 102 (1971). In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege "(1) a conspiracy; (2) 
motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. M.E.'s S 504 claims assert both procedural and substantive 
violations. In a footnote, the District Court stated "[t]he ALJ determined 
that [Ridgewood] had complied with IDEA's procedural requirements. 
This Court finds that the ALJ's conclusion is supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence in the record." We do not read the ALJ's 
opinion as finding that Ridgewood complied with IDEA's procedural 
requirements. The ALJ merely concluded that any procedural violations 
did not involve bad faith. We do not think this conclusion supports a 
finding that Ridgewood complied with IDEA's procedural requirements. 
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designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or 
class of persons . . . [of] the equal protection of the laws; (3) 
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to 
person or property or the deprivation of any right or 
privilege of a citizen of the United States." Lake v. Arnold, 
112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997). In Lake, we held that the 
mentally retarded are a class protected by S 1985(3), but we 
expressly declined to make this determination with respect 
to handicapped persons. See id. at 685-86 & n.5. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment on M.E.'s 
S 1985 claim because it found no evidence that suggested 
the alleged violation of M.E.'s rights was motivated by racial 
or "otherwise class-based" animus. We agree. Even were we 
to decide that S 1985 protects the disabled in general, there 
is no evidence that Ridgewood's alleged actions were 
motivated by discriminatory animus towards the disabled. 
 
e. Section 1983 Conspiracy Claim 
 
Count Seven of M.E.'s complaint also alleges a S 1983- 
only conspiracy. In order to prevail on a conspiracy claim 
under S 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting 
under color of state law conspired to deprive him of a 
federally protected right. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 
29 (1980); Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 
1997). Unlike S 1985(3), a S 1983 conspiracy claim does not 
require that the conspiracy be motivated by invidious 
discrimination. 
 
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment on this 
claim. M.E. has not demonstrated that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists. At most he has supplied ambiguous 
allegations and vague inferences that cannot defeat 
summary judgment. See Groman, 47 F.3d at 633. 
 
f. Qualified Immunity 
 
A municipal official sued in his individual capacity enjoys 
qualified immunity if his conduct "does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known." W.B. v. Matula, 67 
F.3d 484, 499 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
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457 U.S. 800 (1982)). To defeat qualified immunity in an 
IDEA action, the plaintiff must show that " `the particular 
actions taken by defendants were impermissible under law 
established at that time.' " Matula, 67 F.3d at 500 (quoting 
P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1990)). We 
review the grant of qualified immunity de novo. See Torres 
v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The District Court held that the third-party defendants 
could assert qualified immunity because there was not 
"even a scintilla of evidence from which a reasonable fact- 
finder could infer that the third-party defendants violated 
M.E.'s clearly established federal rights". Because we 
addressed qualified immunity in IDEA claims in W.B. v. 
Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), we will vacate and 
remand so that the District Court may reconsider its 
decision in light of Matula. 
 
g. State Law Claims 
 
The District Court dismissed M.E.'s state law claims 
alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination and the New Jersey Constitution's 
guarantee of a thorough and efficient education because it 
determined third-party defendants enjoyed qualified 
immunity. Because we have vacated the decision that third- 
party defendants enjoy qualified immunity, we will vacate 
the dismissal of M.E.'s state law claims. 
 
IV. 
 
For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed in part and 
vacated and remanded in part. 
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